GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF HIGHWAY SAFETY & ARIZONA PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS' ADVISORY COUNCIL

Present

2017 Crash Reconstruction Conference

September 18-19, 2017 Phoenix, Arizona



Basics of a Vehicular Homicide

Presented by:


Aaron Harder

Vehicular Crimes Bureau Chief

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ELIZABETH ORTIZ EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR




















Collision Reconstruction is based on...

Newton's Second Law of Motion

If acted upon by an outside force, the center of mass of the body will accelerate in the direction of the force. The acceleration of the center of mass is directly proportional

to the force acting upon it and inversely proportional to its mass.

Collision Reconstruction is based on...


Newton's Third Law of Motion

For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. The opposing forces are equal in magnitude and opposite in direction.

Terms

Area of Impact

The place on the road or ground closest to the first contact between the colliding objects; impact/collision suggests a series of events which usually involve motion in an area over a period of time.












































































The defendant committed Unlawful Flight, In the course of and in furtherance of the crime or immediate flight from this crime, The defendant or another person caused the death of any person

Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life the defendant recklessly engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death



Aggravated Assault

Using a dangerous instrument,

Recklessly caused,

A physical injury to another

Recklessly endangered Another person with a substantial risk of imminent death


A person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard of such risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. A person who creates such a risk but who is unaware of such risk solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts recklessly with respect to such risk.

A person fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature

CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE

The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.





BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT

- It is not beyond all doubt
- It is not beyond every doubt
- It is not beyond imaginary doubt
- $\ {\scriptstyle \blacksquare} \$ It is not beyond a shadow of a doubt

If you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty then you must find Him guilty!



RECKLESSLY MEANS

A person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists.

The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard of such risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.

It is no defense that a person who created such a risk was unaware of it solely because of voluntary intoxication

A person who creates such a risk but who is unaware of such risk solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts recklessly with respect to such risk.

The Defendant Acted Recklessly

Controlled Substance Use §382.213

No driver shall report for duty or remain on duty requiring the performance of safety-sensitive functions when the driver uses any controlled substance, except when the use is pursuant to the instructions of a licensed medical practitioner who has advised the driver's ability to safely operate a commercial motor vehicle.



METHAMPHETAMINE

- Therapeutic Taken under doctors supervision, controlled doses; safe amounts of the drug.
- Recreational Purpose other than medical purposes.
- Therapeutic Range 50 to 200 ng/ml
- Defendant had 460 ng/ml of Methamphetamine in his blood.
- Dr. Abrams and Dr. Platt would not ride with the defendant.


Methamphetamine Made In Clandestine Labs

- No controls
- Use pseudoephedrine
- Use carburetor fluid
- Use fertilizer
- Use lithium from batteries
- Mixed with other things.


The Defendant Failed to Act



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THE IMPAIRMENT	
FID IO ST T	

IMPAIRMENT

Detective Campbell and Officer Toland

Highly trained in detecting drug impairment

Slow and Deliberate Walk

- Fidgety
- Sway
- High pulse 116 bpmWalk and Turn
- Poor balance
- Stepped off the line twice
 Body Tremors
- Dilated pupils in room light
- Dropped water bottle Poor judgment
- Defendant's statements
 - Ice Cream
- How the crash occurred
- Could not do more tests because refused

John Musselman

- Forensic Toxicologist for the City of Phoenix
- Impairment is a measurable loss of ability to perform a task; manifests itself when a driver makes a mistake and either is pulled over or crashes.
- Abusive levels Likely to see:
 - Perception affected
 - Increase risk taking
 - Reaction take longer to react
 - Meth is a mind altering drug
 - Impact estimates of speed, distance and time

2007 Presentation On Meth Impaired Driver In Arizona

- Looked at level of meth where DRE called impairment
- Looked at driving behavior
- 9% Over 1000 ng/ml of Meth
- 50% 200 to 1000 ng/ml of Meth
- 40% Less than 200 ng/ml of meth
- Violent crashes, went left of center
- Arms out during the Walk and Turn

DR. BARRY LOGAN

Ph.D. Forensic Toxicology

Over 25 years experience in toxicology

Expert drugs and their affects on humans and

<u>Impairment</u> – the ability to perform a particular task; interferes with the ability of the skills to perform a particular task; are able to perform a task but cannot perform as efficiently.

Dr. Logan's Opinion

At the time of the collision the defendant was under the influence of

Methamphetamine!

- Fidgety behavior
- Finger movements
- Errors on the Walk and Turn Balance with arms Motor functions
- High pulse, 116 bpm
- Dilated pupils
- Stress of event
- Methamphetamine in blood affects brain chemistry; negative impact on driving
- Driver inattention
- Methamphetamine
- concentration
- Crash itself

-	
-	

























The Defendant's Stories

- 1. To Justin Burford Asked Justin what happened
- 2. To Tania Krukoff $\label{eq:definition} \textbf{Defendant did} \ \ \textbf{not see them; was reaching for paperwork;}$ nothing said about brakes
- To Todd Mielke Said nothing about brakes
- To Brett Campbell

Looking for a sandwich shop; saw motorcycles stopped at a red light; looked south for a sandwich shop; looked back and on top of the motorcycles; tried to stop but could not.

Stopped for the Red Light

- 1. Stephen Punch
- 2. Daniel Butler
- 3. Dayle Totonchi
- 4. Clyde Nachand
- 5. Ernie Lizarraga
- 6. Jason Anania
- Terrance Lauritsen
- 8. Julie Fantechi
- Todd Faasse
- 10. William Adams



THE BRAKES

Phil Smith

Expert Mechanic

Officer Pacheco

- Three of Six Brakes out of adjustment
- Will Stop, not as efficientlyShould have seen in Pretrip inspection
- Not a catastrophic brake failure

Alan Coulter – testified no mechanical or brake failure.



DANGEROUS DANGEROUS OFFENSE DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT An offense is a dangerous "Dangerous Instrument" offense if it involved the means anything that under use of a dangerous the circumstances in which it is used is readily capable instrument. of causing death or serious physical injury "Dangerous Instrument" means anything that under the circumstances in which it is used is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury. Examples: ■ Pen/Pencil – used for writing not a dangerous instrument; used for stabbing an eye out it is a dangerous instrument ■ Bottle – used as a container not a dangerous instrument; break it and use it to stab or slash a person it is a dangerous instrument ■ Vehicle – used in a proper and safe manner not a dangerous instrument; use it in an unsafe manner it is a dangerous instrument THE DEFENSE Dr. Abrams Dr. Lance Platt Alan Coulter Randy Anglin

FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY







Helping the Jury to Understand Reckless Behavior

by John Kwasnoski


Prosecutors and police have all seen the fatal DWI crash in which the defendant's vehicle barreled out of control at a speed greatly in excess of the posted limit, went out of control, struck a tree or utility pole. and may have even torn the vehicle in two. There is little doubt about the speed, but as the case is prepared for trial the prosecution is troubled by the jury's potential inability to find the defendant's behavior to be reckless. So let's take a look at what reckless operation of a motor vehicle really is from the perspective of the person who designs the roads to be safe.

A General Definition of Reckless

Webster's definition of reckless includes such language as "not regarding consequences" and "irresponsible," but making it clear to the jury might include relating the defendant's behavior to the driver behavior for which the roadway itself was designed to be safe. Why was the speed limit of the road posted as it was - what safety and human factor considerations led to the decision to post the legal speed limit at 35 mph? This could involve the town engineer or highway engineer. or an outside roadway design expert to explain to the jury the design considerations involved with the determination of a safe speed limit for any road. If the road is posted with a speed limit of 35 mph it should be understandable that operating at a speed of 65 mph on that road might create situations that are not safe, and that might endanger other people using the road.

Engineering Roads

For example, in the design of a new condominium complex the planners had to look at how much sight distance would be afforded to people in the complex who wanted to exit the driveway and enter the roadway safely. A sight assessment was conducted, and then a determination was made of the safe operating speed consistent with that sight distance. Perhaps changes were made to the road environment to provide the needed sight distance. If there was insufficient sight distance it may have been necessary to post signs on the road warning of a "hidden driveway." The driveway design is evaluated with regard to established highway design guidelines published in either a state highway design



manual or in a nationally-recognized manual like the "green book" (1). The professional highway design engineer can explain to a jury the consequences of people exiting a driveway onto a roadway when available sight distance does not allow them to see approaching

If it looks, walks, and sounds like recklessness be sure the jury can connect the defendant's reckless actions with the legal definition they will hear in the charging instructions.

traffic, because the traffic is traveling at too great a speed. The engineer can explain the reality of "an accident waiting to happen" when drivers operate at speeds well in excess of the posted limit at particular locations along the roadway on which the defendant operator traveled.

In one case in which the author worked, a site map of the roadway showed over thirty potentially dangerous situations created by the defendant operator's excessive speed, including inability to see around turns in the roadway, over the crests of rolling hills, approaching pedestrian crosswalks, and approaching traffic control signs and intersections. Clearly, the design guidelines showed that at the speed the defendant was operating the situations were not safe for other drivers operating prudently. In fact,

(Continued on page 6)

Reckless Behavior (Continued from page 5)

based on the defendant's speed being so far in excess of the safe design speed for the road, the jury could clearly see that it was almost a certainty that the defendant driver would eventually cause a crash.

looks, walks, and sounds like recklessness be sure the jury can connect the defendant's reckless actions with the legal definition they will hear in the charging instructions.

Physics at Western New England College, Springfield, MA after 31 years on the faculty. He is a certified police trainer in more than 20 states. He is the crash reconstructionist on the "Lethal Weapon - DWI Homicide" team formed by the National Traffic

Law Center to teach prosecutors how to utilize expert witness testimony and cross examine adverse expert witnesses and he is the author

of the book, "Investigation and Prosecution of DWI and Vehicular Homicide" Prof. Kwasnoski has reconstructed over 650 crashes.

(1) "A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets," 1990, AASHTO (American Association of State Highway Transportation Officials).

Be Visual

A site map could be used to show potentially dangerous situations where the defendant's

speed created a potential for disaster. The local engineer could tell the jury why each situation was so dangerous based on the guidelines used to design the road and determine what the speed limit should be. The jury should be able to see why they themselves would be in danger if they had been on that road at the time the defendant's crash occurred. If it

This tactic of connecting the meaning of reckless to the safety considerations governing safe road design might resonate with jurors and give them a basis for reaching a decision.

Editor's Note: John B. Kwasnoski is Professor Emeritus of Forensic

Calendar of Events

February 17	Basic Cops in Court	Kalamazoo
March 24	Working with the Media	Bath
April 4	Basic PowerPoint	Lansing
April 20	Advanced Cops in Court	Ann Arbor
May 3-4	Basic OWI Prosecution	Grand Rapids
June 8	Advanced Cops in Court	Bay City
July 7	Advanced PowerPoint	Lansing
August 10-11	Advanced OWI Prosecution	Lansing
September 6-16	Regional Round Table Meetings	Kalamazoo Ann Arbor Port Huron Gaylord Escanaba
September 27-29	Protecting Lives, Saving Futures	Lansing

Westlaw.

95 P.3d 116

32 Kan.App.2d 1087, 95 P.3d 116 (Cite as: 32 Kan.App.2d 1087, 95 P.3d 116)

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State v. DoubKan.App.,2004.

Court of Appeals of Kansas. STATE of Kansas, Appellee,

V.

John P. DOUB, III, Appellant. No. 90,536.

Aug. 6, 2004. Review Denied Dec. 14, 2004.

Background: Defendant was convicted in the Sedgwick District Court, Rebecca L. Pilshaw, J., of second-degree murder, and he appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Greene, J., held that, as matter of first impression:

- (1) the required state of mind for depraved heart murder can be attributed to the driver of an automobile in a fatal collision, and relevant factors to show such state of mind include intoxication, speeding, and near or nonfatal collisions shortly before the fatal accident; and
- (2) evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for depraved heart murder.

Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Criminal Law 110 1144:13(3)

110 Criminal Law 110XXIV Review 110XXIV(M) Presumptions

110k1144 Facts or Proceedings Not Shown by Record

110k1144.13 Sufficiency of Evidence 110k1144.13(2) Construction of

Evidence

110k1144.13(3) k. Construction

in Favor of Government, State, or Prosecution. Most Cited Cases

Criminal Law 110 €=1159.2(7)

110 Criminal Law 110XXIV Review 110XXIV(P) Verdicts

> 110k1159 Conclusiveness of Verdict 110k1159.2 Weight of Evidence in

General

110k1159.2(7) k. Reasonable

Doubt. Most Cited Cases

When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard of review is whether, after review of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

[2] Homicide 203 €=533

203 Homicide

203∏ Murder

203k533 k. Recklessness, Wantonness, or Extreme Indifference. Most Cited Cases
Depraved heart murder is distinguished from reckless involuntary manslaughter by the additional element that the reckless killing occur under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. K.S.A. 21-3402(b).

|3| Homicide 203 €=533

203 Homicide

203II Murder

203k533 k. Recklessness, Wantonness, or Extreme Indifference. Most Cited Cases Recklessness that can be assimilated to purpose or knowledge is treated as depraved heart second-degree murder, and less extreme recklessness is punished as manslaughter. K.S.A. 21-3402(b).

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[4] Homicide 203 546

203 Homicide 203II Murder

203k544 Second Degree Murder

203k546 k. Intent or Mens Rea; Malice.

Most Cited Cases

Amendment to the second-degree murder statute eliminated malice as an element of second-degree murder in Kansas. K.S.A. 21-3402.

[5] Automobiles 48A €=343

48A Automobiles 48AVII Offenses 48AVII(A) In General

> 48Ak342 Homicide 48Ak343 k. Murder, Most Cited Cases

The required state of mind for depraved heart murder can be attributed to the driver of an automobile in a fatal collision, and relevant factors to show such state of mind include intoxication, speeding, near or nonfatal collisions shortly before the fatal accident, driving on the wrong side of the road, failure to aid the victim, failure to heed traffic signs, failure to heed warnings about reckless driving, and a prior record of driving offenses. K.S.A. 21-3402(b).

[6] Homicide 203 €=533

203 Homicide 203II Murder

203k533 k. Recklessness, Wantonness, or Extreme Indifference. Most Cited Cases
Deprayed heart murder requires an entirely different level of culpability from that required for vehicular

level of culpability from that required for vehicular homicide K.S.A. 21-3402(b)

[7] Automobiles 48A €=355(13)

48A Automobiles 48AVII Offenses

48AVII(B) Prosecution

48Ak355 Weight and Sufficiency of

Evidence

48Ak355(13) k. Homicide. Most Cited

Cases

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's

conviction for depraved heart murder; defendant admitted that his driving was preceded by drinking, defendant admitted that he struck two parked cars and ignored commands to stop because he was concerned that he had been drinking, defendant then consumed additional alcohol and used crack cocaine, defendant resumed driving and caused a fatal collision due in part to excessive speed, defendant failed to render aid to victims, and defendant fled scene in order to avoid criminal liability. K.S.A. 21-3402(b).

**117 *1087 Syllabus by the Court

- 1. Deprayed heart murder as defined by K.S.A. 21-3402(b) is distinguished from reckless involuntary manslaughter by the additional element that the reckless killing occur under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.
- 2. Recklessness that can be assimilated to purpose or knowledge is treated as depraved heart second-degree murder, and less extreme recklessness is punished as manslaughter.
- 3. The 1993 amendment to K.S.A. 21-3402 eliminated malice as an element of second-degree murder in Kansas.
- 4. The required state of mind for depraved heart murder can be attributed to the driver of an automobile in a fatal collision; relevant factors to show such state of mind include intoxication, speeding, near or nonfatal collisions shortly before the fatal accident, driving on the wrong side of the road, failure to aid the victim, failure to heed traffic signs, failure to heed warnings about reckless driving, and a prior record of driving offenses.
- 5. Under the facts of this case, evidence is sufficient to support a conviction of depraved heart murder by the driver of an automobile where: (a) defendant admits that his driving was preceded by drinking; (b) defendant admits that he struck two parked cars and ignored commands to stop because he was concerned that he had been drinking; (c) defendant then consumed additional alcohol and used crack cocaine; (d) defendant then resumed driving and caused a fatal collision, due in part to excessive speed; (e) defendant failed to render aid to the

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victims; and (f) defendant fled the scene in order to avoid criminal liability. We conclude that these facts clearly demonstrate an extreme indifference to human life.

Korey A. Kaul, assistant appellate defender, for appellant.

*1088 Kristi L. Barton, assistant district attorney, Nola Foulston, district attorney, and Phill Kline, attorney general, for appellee.

Before GREENE, P.J., McANANY, J., and BRAZIL, S.J. GREENE, J.

John P. Doub, III, appeals his conviction of second-degree murder pursuant to K.S.A. 21-3402(b), claiming insufficiency of evidence. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Overview

Following a party for his softball team at a club where he admitted drinking six beers, Doub admitted that his pickup struck two parked vehicles and that he left the scene because he was concerned that he had been drinking. Doub ultimately admitted that, approximately 2 hours after striking the parked cars, he drove his pickup into the rear of a Cadillac in which 9-year-old Jamika Smith was a passenger. According to the State's accident investigator, the collision occurred as Doub's pickup, "going tremendously faster," drove "up on top of [the Cadillac]," initially driving it down into the pavement, and ultimately propelling it off the street and into a tree. Doub offered no aid to the victims, left the scene of the accident, and initially denied any involvement in the collision, suggesting that his pickup had been stolen. Some 15 hours after the collision, Smith died as a result of blunt traumatic injuries caused by the collision.

Approximately 6 months after these events, **Doub** admitted to a former girlfriend that he had a confrontation with his second ex-wife the evening of the collision, had been drinking alcohol and smoking crack, and had subsequently caused the collision. The girlfriend approached the authorities

with **Doub's** statements, which suggested that **Doub** left the softball party, caused the collisions with the parked vehicles, left that scene, subsequently consumed the additional alcohol and crack cocaine, and then caused the collision resulting in Smith's death, all within a 2- to 3-hour period.

Doub was charged with: (1) second-degree depraved heart murder, with lesser included **118 offenses of involuntary manslaughter and vehicular homicide; (2) involuntary manslaughter while driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, with the lesser included *1089 offense of driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs; and (3) leaving the scene of an injury accident. The jury found Doub guilty of all three primary offenses, but the court later dismissed the second offense of involuntary manslaughter. Doub challenging the sufficiency of evidence to support his conviction of second-degree depraved heart murder.

Standard of Review

[1] When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard of review is whether, after review of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jamison, 269 Kan. 564, 571, 7 P.3d 1204 (2000).

Elements of Second-degree "Depraved Heart" Murder

K.S.A.2003 Supp. 21-3402 defines second-degree murder as follows:

"Murder in the second-degree is the killing of a human being committed:

(a) Intentionally; or

(b) unintentionally but recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life."

When the offense is committed pursuant to subsection (b), our courts have employed the

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common-law nomenclature of "depraved heart" second-degree murder. See, e.g., State v. Hebert, 277 Kan. 61, 104, 82 P.3d 470 (2004).

[2][3] In State v. Robinson, 261 Kan. 865, 876-78, 934 P.2d 38 (1997), our Supreme Court discussed the requirements for deprayed heart murder:

"Both depraved heart murder and reckless involuntary manslaughter require recklessness-that the killing be done under circumstances showing a realization of the imminence of danger and a conscious disregard of that danger. Depraved heart murder requires the additional element that the reckless killing occur under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.

"We hold that depraved heart second-degree murder requires a conscious disregard of the risk, sufficient under the circumstances, to manifest extreme indifference to the value of human life. Recklessness that can be assimilated to purpose *1090 or knowledge is treated as depraved heart second-degree murder, and less recklessness is punished as manslaughter. Conviction of depraved heart second-degree murder requires proof that the defendant acted recklessly under circumstances manifesting indifference to the value of human life. This language describes a kind of culpability that differs in degree but not in kind from the ordinary recklessness required for manslaughter." (Emphasis added.) 261 Kan. at 876-78, 934 P.2d 38.

In Robinson, the court specifically rejected the argument that the offense required general indifference to the value of all human life and concluded that the elements could be met if the defendant manifested an extreme indifference to the value of one specific human life. 261 Kan. at 880, 934 P.2d 38. In State v. Davidson, 267 Kan. 667, 684, 987 P.2d 335 (1999), the court reiterated the Robinson criteria and held that the offense was committed by a defendant who created an unreasonable risk and then consciously disregarded it in a manner and to the extent that it reasonably could be inferred that she was extremely indifferent to the value of human life.

We find no reported decision in Kansas construing and applying K.S.A. 21-3402(b) in the context of a vehicular collision and therefore approach this appeal as a case of first impression.

Overview of Depraved Heart Murder by Vehicle in Other Jurisdictions

[4] The state of mind or mens rea required for murder has been somewhat second-degree problematic throughout the history**119 Anglo-American jurisprudence. As early as 1762. Sir Michael Foster termed the requisite mental state for the common-law offense as a "heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent upon mischief." Foster, Crown Law 257 (1762). Since the advent of the automobile in the nineteenth century, many jurisdictions have struggled with the application of second-degree murder statutes in this context, and the debate seems to have been focused largely on whether malice, whether express or implied, should be required. See, e.g., State v. Chalmers, 100 Ariz. 70, 411 P.2d 448 (1966). We need not enter this debate, however, since our Supreme Court has determined that the 1993 amendment to the second-degree murder statute eliminated malice as an element of second-degree murder in Kansas. *1091State v. McCown, 264 Kan. 655, Syl. ¶ 1, 957 P.2d 401 (1998). Instead, our focus is the statutory language adopted in Kansas that apparently had its genesis in the Model Penal Code first proposed in 1962, which required killing " recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life." A.L.I., Model Penal Code § 210.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).

Since 1975 the appellate courts of many states have acknowledged that the required state of mind for depraved heart murder can be attributed to the driver of an automobile. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 593 So.2d 145, 148 (Ala.Crim.App.1991) (holding that under Alabama depraved heart statute, driver could be convicted if the driver was "conscious of his acts, the impending dangers surrounding him, and the probable results of the acts, and, with reckless indifference to the probable consequences of his acts, brought about the collision and the death

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of the deceased"). Our review of such cases reveals that most jurisdictions with statutory provisions patterned after the Model Penal Code have acknowledged that the offense may be committed by automobile. Cases to the contrary generally construe and apply statutes that retain some requirement of malice. See, e.g. State v. Ellison, 561 So.2d 576 (Fla.1990) (holding that under Florida law, defendant's conviction of second-degree murder for speeding and eluding officers during a high speed pursuit could not stand without evidence of "'ill-will, hatred, spite or an evil intent'"); see Annot., Homicide By Automobile As Murder, 21 A.L.R.3d 116.

[5] One commentator surveyed 20 cases between 1975 and 1986 and found the following factors as persuasive of the requisite state of mind:

"1. <u>Intoxication</u>. The driver was using alcohol, illegal drugs, or both.

"2. Speeding. Usually excessive rates are recorded.

- "3. Near or nonfatal collisions shortly before the fatal accident. Courts believe that collisions should serve as a warning to defendants that their conduct is highly likely to cause an accident. Failure to modify their driving is viewed as a conscious indifference to human life.
- "4. <u>Driving on the wrong side of the road.</u> Many cases involve head-on collisions. Included here is illegally passing or veering into oncoming traffic.
- "5. Failure to aid the victim. The driver left the scene of the accident and/or never attempted to seek aid for the victim.
- *1092 "6. Failure to heed traffic signs. Usually more than once prior to the fatal accident, the driver ran a red light and/or stop sign.

"7. Failure to heed warnings about reckless driving. In Pears v. State, for example, the court cited as proof of Pears' extreme indifference to life the fact that he continued driving after he had been warned by police officers not to drive because he was intoxicated. In other cases a police pursuit of the driver for earlier traffic violations was an implicit warning that the defendant's driving was dangerous.

"8. <u>Prior record of driving offenses (drunk or reckless driving or both)</u>. The relevance of a defendant's prior record for reckless or intoxicated driving is, as <u>United States v. Fleming</u> pointed out, not to show a propensity to drive while drunk but '

to establish that defendant had grounds to be aware of the risk his drinking and driving while intoxicated presented to others.' "Luria, Death on the Highway: Reckless Driving as Murder, 67 Or. L.Rev. 799, 823 (1988).

Application of these factors seems appropriate to determine whether evidence in a particular case meets the requisite state of mind, but we are mindful that no precise universal definition or exclusive criteria is appropriate. The comments to the Model Penal Code declare that "recklessness" must be of such an extreme nature that it demonstrates an indifference to human life similar to that held by one who commits murder purposely or knowingly, but precise definition is impossible. "The significance of purpose of knowledge as a standard of culpability is that, cases of provocation or other mitigation apart, purposeful or knowing homicide demonstrates precisely such indifference to the value of human life. Whether recklessness is so extreme that it demonstrates similar indifference is not a question, it is submitted, that can be further clarified. It must be left directly to the trier of fact under instructions which make it clear that recklessness that can fairly be assimilated to purpose or knowledge should be treated as murder and that less extreme recklessness should be punished as manslaughter." A.L.I., Model Penal Code & Commentaries Part II § 210.2, Comment. 4,

Did the Evidence Against Doub Establish the Requisite State of Mind for Second-degree Murder?

pp. 21-22 (1980).

Many of the factors cited as relevant to the requisite state of mind in similar prosecutions beyond Kansas are present here. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, our examination of the record shows:

- *1093 (i) The State presented evidence of intoxication, both the consumption of beer at the club, but the later consumption of alcohol and use of crack cocaine;
- (ii) The State presented evidence of nonfatal collisions shortly before the fatal collision,

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specifically the collision with two parked vehicles;

- (iii) The State presented evidence of speeding at the time of the fatal collision, specifically that Doub's vehicle was moving "tremendously faster" than the vehicle struck;
- (iv) The State presented evidence of driving on the wrong side of the road when one of the parked vehicles was hit:
- (v) The State presented evidence of leaving the scene of all incidents, both with parked vehicles and the vehicle containing Smith; moreover, Doub did not attempt to render aid to Smith but rather chose to flee to avoid criminal liability;
- (vi) The State presented evidence of residents near the parked vehicles shouting at Doub to stop, but **Doub** failed to heed these warnings.

Doub argues that his conduct was not even sufficiently egregious to constitute vehicular homicide, citing State v. Krovvidi, 274 Kan. 1059, 58 P.3d 687 (2002), which reversed a conviction for vehicular homicide. The following language defines the crime of vehicular homicide, which is quite different from the language defining depraved

"Vehicular homicide is the unintentional killing of a human being committed by the operation of an automobile, airplane, motor boat or other motor vehicle in a manner which creates an unreasonable risk of injury to the person or property of another and which constitutes a material deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would observe under the same circumstances." K.S.A. 21-3405.

[6] The facts in Krovvidi, however, differed greatly from those before us. In Krovvidi, the State pointed exclusively to inattentive driving and the fact that the driver drove through a red light as factors showing conduct that rose to the level of culpability required under the vehicular homicide statute. 274 Kan. at 1070-71, 58 P.3d 687. *1094 Here, the facts are far more egregious. Moreover, depraved heart murder requires an entirely different level of culpability from that required for vehicular homicide. The following language from Krovvidi is instructive:

"In this case, there are no aggravating factors present. Krovvidi had not been drinking and was not under the influence of any drug, both factors which may provide**121 the additional evidence to establish a material deviation. None of the passengers in his vehicle warned him as he was about to enter the intersection; none were concerned that his driving appeared reckless or that he was accelerating or speeding as he approached the intersection. Krovvidi was not speeding and proceeded through the intersection thinking his light was green. Absent additional aggravating factors, we conclude that his conduct does not amount to the material deviation required under the provisions [of] K.S.A 21-3405." 274 Kan. at 1075, 58 P.3d 687.

In contrast to Krovvidi, Doub had been drinking, was undoubtedly under the influence of crack cocaine, ignored commands to stop, was speeding at least by comparison if not illegally, and otherwise exhibited additional factors of recklessness. Doub's reliance on Krovvidi is simply misplaced.

[7] Considering the presence of many of those factors significant to other courts, we are convinced that a rational factfinder could have found Doub guilty of depraved heart second-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence against Doub is particularly damning considering that (a) he admits that his driving was preceded by drinking; (b) he admits that he struck two parked cars and ignored commands to stop because he was concerned that he had been drinking; (c) he then consumed additional alcohol and used crack cocaine; (d) he then resumed driving and caused a fatal collision, due in part to excessive speed; (e) he failed to render aid to the victims; and (f) he fled the scene in order to avoid criminal liability. We conclude that these facts clearly demonstrate an extreme indifference to human life.

Affirmed.

Kan.App.,2004. State v. Doub 32 Kan.App.2d 1087, 95 P.3d 116

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